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Abstract
An iris recognition system is vulnerable to presentation
attacks, or PAs, where an adversary presents artifacts such
as printed eyes, plastic eyes, or cosmetic contact lenses to
circumvent the system. In this work, we propose an ef-
fective and robust iris PA detector called D-NetPAD based
on the DenseNet convolutional neural network architecture.
It demonstrates generalizability across PA artifacts, sen-
sors and datasets. Experiments conducted on a proprietary
dataset and a publicly available dataset (LivDet-2017) sub-
stantiate the effectiveness of the proposed method for iris
PA detection. The proposed method results in a true detec-
tion rate of 98.58% at a false detection rate of 0.2% on the
proprietary dataset and outperfoms state-of-the-art meth-
ods on the LivDet-2017 dataset. We visualize intermedi-
ate feature distributions and fixation heatmaps using t-SNE
plots and Grad-CAM, respectively, in order to explain the
performance of D-NetPAD. Further, we conduct a frequency
analysis to explain the nature of features being extracted by
the network. The source code and trained model are avail-
able at https://github.com/iPRoBe-lab/D-NetPAD.
1. Introduction
An iris biometric system recognizes an individual based
on the textural pattern of their iris [9]. The increasing popu-
larity of iris systems and their unattended mode of operation
make them susceptible to presentation attacks. According
to ISO/IEC 30107-1:2016 [2], a Presentation Attack (PA)
is a “presentation to the biometric data capture subsystem
with the goal of interfering with the operation of the biomet-
ric system”. The biometric characteristics or materials used
to launch a presentation attack are termed as Presentation
Attack Instruments (PAIs). Examples of PAIs in the case of
the iris modality include printed iris images [7, 4, 27, 14],
artificial eye (plastic, glass, or doll eyes) [14, 22], cosmetic
contacts [28, 37, 18], video display of an eye image [30, 6],
cadaver eyes [23, 6], robotic eye models [21] and holo-
graphic eye images [25]. A few samples of iris PAIs are
shown in Fig. 1. There is a need to detect these known iris
PAs as well as other “unknown” and “unseen” PAs that may
compromise the security of iris-based biometric systems.1
In this work, our objective is to develop an effective and
explainable iris PA detector.
Figure 1. Example of presentation attacks (PAs) launch on the iris
modality: (a) artificial eyes, (b) printed iris images, and (c) cos-
metic contacts.
Existing techniques in the literature used to counter iris
PAs can be categorized as being either hardware-based or
software-based. Hardware-based techniques require phys-
ical devices in addition to the conventional iris sensor to
aid in PA detection. Examples include the use of IrisCUBE
camera to capture pupil dynamics [5], 3D structural model-
ing of an eye using stereo imaging [18], use of CCD camera
with two white LEDs to initiate and record pupillary reflex
[19] and EyeLink II eye tracker to capture Oculomotor Plant
Characteristics [20]. These techniques incur an additional
cost due to the hardware involved. Moreover, image acqui-
sition using these methods is typically time-consuming and
requires explicit user cooperation.
On the other hand, software-based techniques extract
salient features from the digital iris image in order to clas-
sify it as a bonafide or a PA.2 These features can be either
hand-crafted or can be learned using deep learning schemes.
Examples of hand-crafted features used to detect iris PAs in-
1An “unknown” or “unseen” attack involves using PAIs that were not
observed in the training data.
2A “bonafide” image is sometimes referred to as a “live” image in the
literature.
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Figure 2. Flowchart of the D-NetPAD algorithm. Iris region (red box) is detected and cropped from the ocular image and input to the
D-NetPAD architecture. The base architecture used in D-NetPAD is Dense121 [17]. It produces a single PA score, which determines
whether an input image is a bonafide or a PA.
clude SIFT [43], LBP [16], BSIF [31], and SID [12]. How-
ever, more recently, a number of deep-learning based meth-
ods have been proposed [24, 26, 3, 15, 38, 39]. Menotti et
al. [24] propose a deep architecture for PA detection called
SpoofNet. Pala and Bhanu [26] develop a deep framework
built upon triplet convolutional networks. Hoffman et al.
[14] focus on detecting iris PAs utilizing a patch-batch con-
volutional neural network (CNN) that is observed to per-
form well in the cross-sensor and cross-dataset scenarios.
They extend their work [15] by analyzing the importance of
utilizing the periocular region in detecting iris PAs. Chen
and Ross [3] propose a multi-task CNN for first detecting
the iris region and then classifying it. Yadav et al. [39]
utilize a Relativistic Average Standard Generative Adver-
sarial Network (RaSGAN) as a one-class classifier to detect
unseen or unknown iris PAs. The Liveness Detection-Iris
Competition (LivDet-Iris) held in 2013 [41], 2015 [42] and
2017 [40] provides a comprehensive comparative report of
different iris PA detection techniques. Czajka and Bowyer
[6] also present a detailed assessment of various state-of-
the-art iris PA detection (PAD) algorithms. While most of
these methods resulted in very high PA detection rates, gen-
eralizability across PAs, sensors, and datasets is still a chal-
lenging problem [37, 11, 28].
In this paper, we propose a CNN-based iris PAD method
that utilizes the DenseNet [17] architecture. Yadav et al.
[38] also utilize the DenseNet architecture to detect cos-
metic contact PA images captured by various mobile iris
sensors. On the other hand, our work considers a much
large range of iris PAs captured by various desktop and mo-
bile iris sensors. The DenseNet architecture has a unique
property that each layer is connected to every other layer in
a feed-forward fashion. The features across different lay-
ers correspond to different resolutions. The aggregated ef-
fect of multi-resolution features efficiently characterize the
iris pattern as the iris pattern is highly stochastic in nature
and the intricate features of the iris stroma are manifested in
multiple resolution [8]. The main contributions of the work
are as follows:
1. We propose an effective and robust iris PA detector
named as D-NetPAD that is based on the DenseNet
architecture. We also demonstrate that the proposed
detector exhibits generalizability across different PAs,
sensors, datasets.
2. We evaluate the performance of D-NetPAD on a pro-
prietary dataset (Combined) as well as a publicly avail-
able dataset (LivDet-2017).
3. We perform visualizations using t-SNE plots [35] and
Grad-CAM [32] to explain the performance of the pro-
posed method. The t-SNE plots provide visualization
of features obtained from the intermediate layers of the
model. The Grad-CAM produces heatmaps emphasiz-
ing the salient regions in an iris image that are used by
the network to detect iris PAs.
4. We also conduct a frequency analysis to understand the
frequencies learned by the model and, based on that,
interpret its performance.
Section 2 discusses the architecture of the proposed
method. Section 3 describes the experimental setup and
results on both the datasets. Section 4 provides a detailed
analysis of the results obtained from the D-NetPAD. Finally,
section 5 concludes the paper.
2. D-NetPAD Description
Dense Network Presentation Attack Detection (D-
NetPAD) is based on the Densely Connected Convolutional
Network 121 (DenseNet121) [17] architecture. The archi-
tecture consists of 121 convolutional layers of kernel size 7
× 7, followed by a max-pooling layer and a series of Dense
blocks and Transition layers. There are four Dense blocks,
and three Transition layers lie between successive Dense
blocks. Each Dense block consists of two convolutional
layers of kernel size 1 × 1 and 3 × 3. Both convolutional
layers are followed by a non-linear ReLU activation layer.
The Transition layer consists of one convolutional layer of
kernel size 1 × 1 and an average pooling layer. It reduces
the size of feature-maps, which is kept constant within a
Dense block. The last layer is a fully connected layer. The
work in [38] exploits the DenseNet architecture of depth 22
with three densely connected blocks.
The most notable characteristic of DenseNet is that each
layer connects to every other layer in a feed-forward fash-
ion. In other words, each layer obtains feature-maps from
preceding layers and passes its feature-maps to subsequent
layers. The features from preceding layers are combined
by concatenation as opposed to the summation performed
in the ResNet [13] architecture. The concatenation re-
moves the constraint of having the same dimension on
the feature-maps. In this way, the architecture ensures
the maximum flow of information in the forward direction
and also resolves the most prevalent challenge of vanish-
ing gradient in the backward direction. Another major ad-
vantage of DenseNet121 is that it supports such densely
and deeply connected network with fewer trainable param-
eters (7,978,856) as compared to its counterpart ResNet50
(35,610,216) [13] or VGG19 (143,667,240) [33]. This is
because DenseNet uses a small set of filters in each layer
(e.g., 12 filters/layer) compared to the traditional convo-
lutional networks (∼128 or 256 filters/layer). DenseNet
preserves the feature-maps and reuses it in the subsequent
layers instead of relearning feature-maps every time. The
reusability of feature-maps helps in alleviating the over-
fitting problem, especially in the case of limited training
data. These architectural tweaks help in generating an effi-
cient feature representation for the highly textured iris pat-
tern. Feature-maps at each layer capture specific spatial and
frequency information and consolidation of these feature-
maps result in the extraction of multi-resolution features.
These features are efficient in characterizing the stochastic
nature of the iris pattern. The intricacy of a bonafide iris
pattern is not present in the spoofed iris (print eye, artifi-
cial eye, or cosmetic contact), and this difference is effi-
ciently captured by the features generated from DenseNet.
The consolidation of feature-maps at the last layer also
smoothens the decision boundaries, resulting in better gen-
eralization across PA artifacts, sensors, and datasets.
Figure 2 shows the flowchart of the proposed architec-
ture. The iris sensor acquires an ocular image which in-
put to the iris detection module. In our implementation, we
use the VeriEye iris detector, which outputs the centers of
the iris and pupil along with their radii. The iris region is
cropped from the ocular image using the center and radius
of the iris. The cropped iris region is then resized to 224
× 224 and input to the pre-trained Dense121 network. The
ImageNet dataset [10] is used to pre-train the network. It
produces a single presentation attack (PA) score, which lies
between 0 and 1. A score approaching ‘1’ indicates that the
input sample is a PA, whereas a score approaching ‘0’ in-
dicates that the input sample is a bonafide. We determine
the threshold by fixing the False Detection Rate to 0.2% in
order to get the final classification. If the PA score is less
than the specified threshold, the input sample is labeled as
a bonafide; otherwise, it is a PA. During training, the learn-
ing rate used is 0.005, the batch size is 20, the optimization
algorithm used is the stochastic gradient descent with a mo-
mentum of 0.9, the number of epochs is 50, and the loss
function is cross-entropy.
3. Evaluation and Results
We performed experiments on a proprietary dataset and
a publicly available benchmark dataset (LivDet-2017) to
evaluate the performance of D-NetPAD. The proprietary
dataset has several subsets and is, therefore, referred to
as the “Combined Dataset” in the rest of the document.
The Combined dataset corresponds to the cross-PA sce-
nario, whereas the LivDet-2017 dataset creates a test-bed
for cross-PA, cross-sensor, and cross-dataset testing scenar-
ios. In the cross-PA scenario, we use PA instruments (PAIs)
that were not used during the training. In the cross-sensor
scenario, we evaluate images from different sensors than
those used during the training. The cross-dataset scenario
incorporates testing under different PAIs, sensors, data ac-
quisition environments (indoor/outdoor, varying illumina-
tion conditions), subject populations, and platforms (desk-
top or mobile). The cross-dataset scenario accounts for
large variations, making it the most challenging test sce-
nario.
3.1. Combined Dataset: Description and Results
The Combined Dataset was collected under the IARPA
Odin program (Presentation Attack Detection) [1]. The
IrisAccess iCAM7000 sensor was used to collect the data.
The dataset is a combination of various component datasets
collected at different locations and times using different
units of the same sensor. Table 1 provides the description of
the component datasets. There are a total of 13,851 iris im-
ages out of which 9,660 are bonafide and 4,291 are PAs.
The PA samples in the dataset correspond to the follow-
ing attack instruments: print, artificial eye, cosmetic con-
tacts, kindle replay, and transparent dome on print. Fig-
ure 3 shows sample images from the dataset. The test set
JHU-APL03 (Table 1) comprises two types of artificial eyes
and 10 different types of cosmetic contacts. It corresponds
to the cross-PA scenario as it contains six additional cos-
metic contacts that are not used during training. As the
process of collecting cosmetic contact images is a tedious
and time-consuming process, its quantity is limited in the
training set. Therefore, we utilize cosmetic contact images
from NDCLD-2015 [34] to overcome the shortcoming. The
bonafide images in the NDCLD-2015 dataset are not used
as the Combined dataset has a large number of bonafide im-
ages. The NDCLD-2015 dataset was collected using the
IrisGuard AD100 and IrisAccess LG4000 sensors.
We evaluate the performance of the D-NetPAD in terms
of True Detection Rate (TDR) at a False Detection Rate
(FDR) of 0.2%. TDR is the percentage of PA samples cor-
rectly detected, whereas FDR is a percentage of bonafide
samples incorrectly classified as PA.3 The D-NetPAD is
3Other commonly used evaluation measures for presentation attack
detection are Attack Presentation Classification Error Rate (APCER)
Figure 3. Sample images of bonafide, different types of PAs (print, artificial eye, cosmetic contact, kindle replay, and transparent dome on
print) taken from the Combined dataset. The last cosmetic contact image is taken from the NDCLD-2015 dataset.
Table 1. Description of different components of the Combined Dataset. Details of the train and test set of the Combined and NDCLD 2015
datasets are also provided in terms of the number of bonafide and PA images. AA and BB are used for anonymization. JHU-APL stands
for Johns Hopkins University-Applied Physics Laboratory.
Dataset Train TestAA IrisPA01 BB IrisPA01 BB IrisPA02 SelfTest01 SelfTest02 SelfTest03 JHU-APL01 JHU-APL02 NDCLD 2015 JHU-APL03
Bonafide 381 962 1,107 446 518 518 1,394 1,371 - 2,963
Print 991 660 415 14 - - - - - -
Artificial Eye 318 34 - 21 9 12 49 111 - 175
Cosmetic Contacts - - 208 - 21 94 78 120 2,236 177
Kindle Replay 51 79 - - - - - - - -
Transparent Dome - - 503 9 - - 42 - - -
Acquisition Time Period Nov 2017 Nov 2017 Dec 2018 April 2018 Feb 2019 Sept 2019 May 2018 May 2019 2015 Nov 2019
compared against two deep learning-based methods ([3]
and [15]) as these are state-of-the-art (SoTA) methods. It
is also compared with VGG19 [33] and ResNet101 [13]
deep architectures. Table 2 presents the results of all five
algorithms. The D-NetPAD outperforms the SoTA meth-
ods [15], [3], VGG19 and ResNet101 by 25.27%, 6.44%,
2.41% and 1.75%, respectively. It resulted in 98.58% TDR
at 0.2% FDR. The performance of D-NetPAD is further an-
alyzed using the histogram of PA scores shown in Figure
4. The vertical line in the figure represents the threshold
corresponding to 0.2% FDR. At the selected threshold, four
bonafide samples are misclassified as PAs and five PAs are
misclassified as bonafides. Figure 5 shows the misclassi-
fied images. In the case of misclassified bonafide images,
subjects in the first two images were wearing hard transpar-
ent contact lenses that closely resemble cosmetic contact
lenses. The subject in the third image wore a soft trans-
parent lens, which may also have been confused with a cos-
metic contact lens. The last image contains glare of the light
reflected from the glasses, resulting in a misclassification.
In the case of misclassified PA images, the D-NetPAD fails
for a particular type of cosmetic contact lens (Halloween-
style Extreme contact lens), where the pattern appears only
at the periphery of the cosmetic contact. Segmentation ig-
nores the outer region of the iris containing the artifacts of
these cosmetic contacts. This resulted in a smaller region
of the artifact being fed into the DenseNet for PA detection,
leading to a misclassification.
3.2. LivDet-2017 Dataset: Description and Results
Another dataset used for evaluation was the LivDet-2017
[40] dataset. The LivDet-2017 dataset is a combination of
four datasets: Clarkson, Warsaw, Notre Dame, and IIITD-
and Bonafide Presentation Classification Error Rate (BPCER). TDR is
1−APCER, and FDR is the same as BPCER.
Table 2. The results of D-NetPAD in term of TDR (%) at 0.2%
FDR on the Combined dataset. The method is compared with
two other algorithms that have participated in the Odin program
of IARPA.
Algorithms [15] [3] VGG19 ResNet101 D-NetPAD
TDR (%) @ 0.2% FDR 78.69 92.61 96.26 96.88 98.58
Figure 4. The histogram of PA scores corresponds to bonafide
(green) and PAs (orange) generated by the D-NetPAD on the JHU-
APL03 test set. The dotted vertical line represents the threshold
(0.40) selected by setting the FDR at 0.2%. At the specified thresh-
old, 4 bonafide and 5 PA images are misclassified.
WVU datasets. Table 3 describes the types of PAs present in
the datasets, and the number of images in the train and test
sets of all four datasets. The Clarkson dataset represents the
cross-PA testing scenario. The test set consists of 5 addi-
tional cosmetic contacts and prints of visible spectrum iris
images captured using an iPhone 5. The Warsaw dataset
helps in evaluating the cross-sensor testing scenario. It con-
sists of two test sets: a “known” sensor and an “unknown”
sensor. The IrisGuard AD100 sensor is used to capture the
images of the training set and the known “known” compo-
nent of the test set. Images of the “unknown” component
of the test set are captured by a setup composed of Aritech
Figure 5. Misclassified iris images by the D-NetPAD algorithm on
the JHU-APL03 test set. The first row shows bonafide images,
which are misclassified as PA. The second row shows PA images,
which are misclassified as bonafide. The PA score of the images is
displayed at the bottom of each image. The threshold for classifi-
cation is 0.40, where a PA score below the threshold is considered
to be a bonafide.
ARX-3M3C camera, SONY EX-View CCD sensor, Fuji-
non DV10X7.5A-SA2 lens, and B+W 092 NIR filter. The
Notre Dame dataset corresponds to the cross-PA scenario. It
also contains two test sets (“known” and “unknown”). The
“unkown” test set includes cosmetic contacts not used in
the training set. The IIITD-WVU dataset consists of data
collected by IIITD and WVU. The IIITD data is used for
training, whereas the WVU data is used for testing. The
dataset corresponds to the cross-dataset scenario, where the
test set incorporates variations in the sensors, data acqui-
sition environment, subject population, and PA generation
procedures. The training set is captured in a controlled en-
vironment using two iris sensors: Cogent dual iris sensor
(CIS 202) and VistaFA2E single iris sensor. The test set
is captured using the IriShield MK2120U mobile iris sen-
sor at two different locations: indoors (controlled illumina-
tion) and outdoors (varying environmental conditions). The
cross-dataset testing scenario represents the most difficult
case.
For the detailed evaluation of the D-NetPAD, we cre-
ated three models of the D-NetPAD network, which differ
in their training process:(i) Pre-trained D-NetPAD: The
model trained on the Combined dataset is directly used;
(ii) Scratch D-NetPAD: The model is trained from scratch
on the LivDet-2017 train sets; and (iii) Fine-tuned D-
NetPAD: The model that is pre-trained on the Combined
dataset is fine-tuned on the LivDet-2017 train sets. The per-
formance measure used is the same as used in [40]: At-
tack Presentation Classification Error Rate (APCER) and
Bonafide Presentation Classification Error Rate (BPCER).
The APCER is the proportion of PA samples misclassi-
fied as bonafide, whereas the BPCER is a proportion of
bonafide samples misclassified as PAs. The D-NetPAD is
compared against the top three winners of the LivDet-2017
competition. Table 4 summarizes the results of all algo-
rithms. While the pre-trained D-NetPAD model and the
model trained from scratch perform at par with the state-
of-the-art methods, the fine-tuned D-NetPAD model outper-
forms the other methods.
We also measured the performance of D-NetPAD in
terms of its TDR at 0.2% FDR on the LivDet-2017 dataset.
Table 5 compiles the results of D-NetPAD on all four
datasets of the LivDet-2017 [1] dataset. A summary of the
results is provided below:
Clarkson Test Dataset: The pre-trained D-NetPAD fails
on the test set of Clarkson. The Clarkson dataset corre-
sponds to the cross-sensor and cross-PA scenarios. The im-
ages captured from IrisAccess EOU2200 is visually quite
different from the images captured by the iCAM 7000 iris
sensor, which results in the poor performance (28.63%).
But, the result improves (92.05% and 93.51%) when the
training set (scratch or fine-tuned) includes the Clarkson
train set (sensor information).
Warsaw Test Dataset: The pre-trained D-NetPAD
achieves competent performance on the Warsaw dataset.
The sensors and types of PA used in the Warsaw dataset
are different from the one used in the training, but the im-
ages captured by the test sensors are visually similar, which
results in comparable TDR. Fine-tuning the pre-trained D-
NetPAD using the train set of Warsaw dataset results in
100% TDR.
Notre Dame Test Dataset: The dataset represents the
cross-PA scenario, where the test set uses additional cos-
metic contacts. The pre-trained D-NetPAD model trained
on diverse cosmetic contacts generalizes well across pre-
viously unseen cosmetic contacts (93.55% and 91%). Its
performance drops on the unknown test set (66.55%) when
the model is trained from scratch as the diversity of cos-
metic contacts is limited in the Notre Dame train set. Fine-
tuning the model with the Notre Dame train set achieves
100% TDR.
IIIT-WVU Test Dataset: The dataset is the most chal-
lenging dataset where the test set images are captured us-
ing the IriShield MK2120U mobile iris sensor and under
different capturing environment (indoor and outdoor). The
dataset also included unseen PAs, resulting in very low
TDRs for all three models (42.91%, 29.30%, and 48.85%).
We further analyze the results of IIIT-WVU by plotting the
PA score distributions of the bonafide and PAs, and estimat-
ing the d-prime distance between them (Figure 6). Though
the TDR is quite low in the case of fine-tuned D-NetPAD,
its histogram shows a better separation (d′ = 2.64) between
the score distributions of bonafide and PAs.
The D-NetPAD algorithm demonstrates robustness
across PAs and sensors testing scenarios after the fine-
tuning but fails in the case of cross-dataset which is a
combination of cross-PA, cross-sensor, cross-environment,
and cross-platform scenarios. Here, cross-platform implies
training on images of iris sensor meant for desktop (e.g.,
IrisAccess iCAM7000) and testing on images of iris sensor
meant for mobile devices (e.g., IriShield MK2120U).
Table 3. Description of the train and test sets of all four subsets of the LivDet-2017 dataset along with the number of bonafide and PA
images present in the datasets. The information about the sensors is also provided. Each subset represents different testing scenarios.
The Clarkson and Notre Dame test sets correspond to the cross-PA scenario, whereas the Warsaw data corresponds to the cross-sensor
scenario. The IIITD-WVU represents a cross-dataset scenario. Here, “K. Test” means a known test set of the dataset, and “U. Test” means
an unknown test set.
Dataset
Clarkson
(Cross-PA)
Warsaw
(Cross-Sensor)
Notre Dame
(Cross-PA)
IIITD-WVU
(Cross-Dataset)
Train Test Train K. Test U. Test Train K. Test U. Test Train Test
Bonafide 2,469 1,485 1,844 974 2,350 600 900 900 2,250 702
Print 1,346 908 2,669 2,016 2,160 - - - 3,000 2,806
Cosmetic Contacts 1,122 765 - - - 600 900 900 1,000 701
Sensor
IrisAccess
EOU2200
IrisGuard
AD100
Aritech ARX-3M3C,
Fujinon DV10X7.5A,
DV10X7.5A-SA2 lens
B+W 092 NIR filter
IrisGuard AD100,
IrisAccess LG4000
Cogent
CIS 202,
VistaFA2E
IriShield
MK2120U
Table 4. D-NetPAD performance reported in terms of APCER and BPCER on all subsets of the LivDet-2017 dataset. The method is
compared with three state-of-the-art algorithms in [40], which are the winners of the LivDet 2017 competition.
Algorithm Clarkson Warsaw IIITD-WVU Notre-Dame AveragedAPCER BPCER APCER BPCER APCER BPCER APCER BPCER APCER BPCER
CASIA 9.61 5.65 3.4 8.6 23.16 16.1 11.33 7.56 11.88 9.48
Anon1 15.54 3.64 6.11 5.51 29.4 3.99 7.78 0.28 14.71 3.36
UNINA 13.39 0.81 0.05 14.77 23.18 35.75 25.44 0.33 15.52 12.92
Pre-Trained D-NetPAD 16.73 19.46 1.66 0.83 16.05 15.24 1.00 2.22 8.86 9.43
Scratch D-NetPAD 5.78 0.94 0 0.04 36.41 10.12 10.38 3.23 13.14 3.58
Fine-tuned D-NetPAD 2.99 2.97 0 0.54 1.88 8.84 0.33 0.27 1.3 3.15
Table 5. D-NetPAD performance reported in terms of the TDR
(%) @ 0.2% FDR on different subsets of the LivDet-2017 dataset.
Three models of D-NetPAD are generated by varying their training
data.
Algorithm Clarkson Warsaw Notre-Dame IIITD-WVUTest K. Test U. Test K. Test U. Test Test
Pre-Trained D-NetPAD 28.63 92.95 98.56 93.55 91.00 42.91
Scratch D-NetPAD 92.05 100 100 100 66.55 29.30
Fine-tuned D-NetPAD 93.51 100 100 100 99.77 48.85
Figure 6. Histograms of the three trained models of D-NetPAD on
the IIITD-WVU test set. For accurate classification, there should
be minimal overlap between the two (red and green) distributions.
This plot indicates the efficacy of the fine-tuned D-NetPAD.
4. Explainability analysis
4.1. Visualization Analysis
We visualize the results of the D-NetPAD using t-
Distributed Stochastic Neighbor Embedding (t-SNE) [35]
plots and Gradient-weighted Class Activation Mapping
(Grad-CAM) heatmaps. We utilize the D-NetPAD model
trained on the training set of the Combined dataset for this
purpose, and use the samples in the JHU-APL03 test set
to generate these visualizations. The t-SNE helps in vi-
sualizing the features extracted from the D-NetPAD. It re-
duces the high-dimensional features extracted from the D-
NetPAD to a lower dimension (two in our case), which
are then used to construct a scatter plot. The architecture
of the D-NetPAD consists of four Dense blocks. We cap-
ture the high-dimensional features at the end of each Dense
block for visualization (Figure 7). For instance, the fea-
ture set captured at the end of Dense block 4 has a size of
1 × 1024 × 7 × 7, which is flattened to 1 × 50, 176. The
50,176-dimensional row vector is then reduced to a two-
dimension vector. We draw three key observations from
these plots:
1. The distributions of bonafide, artificial eye and cos-
metic contact features overlap after the initial Dense
blocks, but separate for the later Dense blocks. As the
depth of the network increases, the features of differ-
ent categories are better separated. This substantiates
the high performance of D-NetPAD (Table 2).
2. The features of different categories are sufficiently dis-
criminated at the end of Dense Block 4, which justifies
the use of four Dense blocks in the architecture as op-
posed to three in [38].
3. The plots shows two bonafide clusters which corre-
spond to the left and right eyes. The left and right irides
exhibit differences due to the orientation of upper and
lower eyelids, location of specular reflection, the rela-
tive position of pupil center to iris center, and back-
ground illumination variation. The D-NetPAD cap-
tures these variations in its features.
We further visualize the CNN activations using the Grad-
CAM [32] heatmaps. The Grad-CAM produces a coarse
localization map highlighting the salient regions in an im-
age that were used by the network to generate its inference.
These are regions that produce high activations in the neural
network. It is estimated using the gradient of a loss func-
tion, which backpropagates through the convolutional lay-
ers to the input image [32]. Figure 8 presents the CNN ac-
tivation heatmaps on bonafide, artificial eye, and cosmetic
contact images taken from the JHU-APL03 test set. The
last column represents the average heatmaps of each cate-
gory considering the entire test set. The red regions indi-
cate high activation, whereas the blue regions represent low
activation. The first row of Figure 8 shows the heatmap
of bonafide sample images along with the average bonafide
heatmap, where the high activation region is at the pupillary
zone of the iris pattern. The second row of Figure 8 corre-
sponds to the heatmap of artificial eye images, where the
focus seems to be mainly on the left and right sub-regions
of the iris. The last row shows the heatmaps of cosmetic
contact images, where the lower sub-region of the iris pat-
tern is focused. The average heatmaps show the distinc-
tive regions of focus in each category, which helps in dis-
criminating bonafide from PAs.
4.2. Spatial Frequency Analysis
The iris is a highly textured pattern exhibiting numer-
ous spatial frequencies. To understand what frequencies the
D-NetPAD model has learned and how it impacts iris PAD
performance, we perform a spatial frequency analysis on the
D-NetPAD model. We attain the objective with the assump-
tion that the performance of the model only gets affected by
the manipulation of learned frequencies. We start by manip-
ulating higher frequencies for two reasons. First, when we
visually examine low- and high-pass filtered images (Figure
9), it is observed that a high-pass filter (suppression of low
frequencies) considerably obscures the iris pattern. Second,
deep learning-based models learn low frequencies first (ini-
tial epochs) and then high frequencies (later epochs) in the
training process [29, 36]. In other words, the volume of
weight parameters contributes towards expressing low fre-
quencies is larger than the one expressing high frequencies
[29]. Due to this, small manipulation in low frequencies re-
sults in large shifts in the performance. In the case of high
frequencies, more the architecture learns the high frequen-
cies, more it tuned its parameters towards the learning deli-
cacies of the training images, which may cause overfitting.
So, learning of high frequencies determines the effective-
ness of the model-fitting on the training data (i.e., efficiently
fit or overfit).
For high frequency suppression, we use a low-pass fil-
ter with various cutoff frequencies. Cutoff frequency repre-
sents a radius from the center in the fourier transforms (sec-
ond row of Figure 9). A low-pass filter allows frequencies
below the cutoff frequency and attenuates higher frequen-
cies. Figure 11 shows the performance of the D-NetPAD
model along with the VGG19 and ResNet101 models on
various low-pass filter cutoff frequencies. We use the train
and test set of the Combined dataset for the experiments.
The manipulation is only applied over the test images.
There are two noteworthy observations. First, D-NetPAD
shows a relatively lower drop in performance compared to
VGG19 and ResNet101 models. Second, the performance
of the D-NetPAD model becomes steady beyond the 30 cut-
off frequency, which implies that the model has not over-
fitted to high frequencies beyond 30. Beyond a cutoff fre-
quency of 60, the performance becomes constant implying
that it has not learned any frequencies beyond 60. An-
other way of manipulating high frequencies is their addi-
tion to the input images, which we did by contaminating in-
put images with salt and pepper noise. We also analyze the
models when Gaussian noise (noise values are Gaussian-
distributed) is added to the input images. Figure 10 shows
an example of an input image subject to high-frequency ma-
nipulation, (b) - (e), and the addition of Gaussian noise,
(f). The performance is measured using a relative decrease
in TDR (%) at 0.2% FDR. Table 6 provides the results of
VGG19, ResNet101, and D-NetPAD architectures when in-
put images are manipulated.
The D-NetPAD model shows a lower decrease in
TDRs compared to VGG19 and ResNet101 models
when high frequencies in input images are manipu-
lated (either suppression or addition). The VGG19 and
ResNet101 models have a large number of trainable param-
eters that result in the overfitting of these models to the
training data. The overfitted models learn higher frequen-
cies considerably well and, therefore, are more sensitive
towards them. On the contrary, efficient learning of fre-
quencies by the D-NetPAD makes it more robust towards
manipulations to the high frequencies and also substanti-
ates its generalizability across PAs, sensors, and datasets.
Gaussian noise randomly affects both lower and higher fre-
quencies, resulting in a higher drop in performance of all
the networks, including D-NetPAD.
5. Conclusion
We propose an effective and robust software-based iris
PA detector called D-NetPAD. The D-NetPAD exploits the
architectural benefits of DenseNet121. Experiments are
performed on two datasets to help assess its effectiveness.
The test sets of these datasets correspond to cross-PA, cross-
sensor, and cross-dataset scenarios which measure the ro-
Figure 7. The architecture of D-NetPAD consists of four Dense blocks. We capture the features at the end of each Dense block, which are
then visualized using t-sne plots (shown below each Dense block). The two-dimensional features of bonafide, artificial eyes, and cosmetic
contacts overlap in the initial layers, but get separated in the last layer. The two blue clusters in each category correspond to the left and
right eyes.
Figure 8. Grad-CAM [32] heatmaps corresponding to bonafide
(first row), artificial eye (second row), and cosmetic contact (last
row). The last column represents the average heatmaps of each
category. The heatmaps represent focused regions of the image by
the D-NetPAD algorithm. Red-colored regions represent highly
focused regions by the D-NetPAD, whereas blue regions represent
low priority ones.
Table 6. Results in terms of TDR (%) @ 0.2% FDR and a relative
decrease in TDR for VGG19, ResNet101, and D-NetPAD models,
when high frequencies are manipulated (suppression or addition)
or when Gaussian noise is applied to the input test images.
Input Test Images VGG19 ResNet101 D-NetPAD
TDR(%)@
0.2% FDR
Relative
Decreased
TDR (%)
TDR(%)@
0.2% FDR
Relative
Decreased
TDR (%)
TDR(%)@
0.2% FDR
Relative
Decreased
TDR (%)
Original Images 96.26 - 96.88 - 98.58 -
LowPass20
(Suppess high freq.) 52.33 45.63 71.65 26.04 81.61 17.21
LowPass30
(Suppress high freq.) 86.60 10.03 88.47 8.68 94.39 4.25
LowPass50
(Suppress high freq.) 94.08 2.26 93.45 3.54 96.88 1.72
Salt & Pepper
(Add high freq.) 74.14 22.97 68.22 29.58 80.99 17.84
Gaussian Noise 56.07 41.75 62.61 35.37 59.19 39.95
bustness of the D-NetPAD. We further explained the per-
formance of the D-NetPAD using t-SNE plots, Grad-CAM
heatmaps and frequency analysis. The source code and
Figure 9. Frequency analysis of an input image. In the first row, the
left-most image is the original image. The center image is a low-
pass filtered image with a cutoff frequency of 20 (higher frequen-
cies are suppressed), and the third is a high-pass filtered image
with a cutoff frequency of 5 (lower frequencies are suppressed).
The second row represents the corresponding fourier transforms.
trained model are available at https://github.com/iPRoBe-
lab/D-NetPAD.
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Figure 11. The plot of TDR (%) @ 0.2% FDR against different
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yond which the performance of D-NetPAD becomes stable (cutoff
frequency 30 in this case). This cutoff frequency indicates that
the D-NetPAD has not learned frequencies beyond this cutoff fre-
quency. The performance steadiness of D-NetPAD is better than
VGG19 and ResNet101.
annotation therein.
References
[1] IARPA, ODNI:IARPA-BAA-16-04 (Thor).
https://www.iarpa.gov/index.php/research-
programs/odin/odin-baa.
[2] ISO/IEC 30107-1:2016: Information technology Biomet-
ric Presentation Attack Detection Part 1: Framework.
https://www.iso.org/standard/53227.html.
[3] C. Chen and A. Ross. A multi-task convolutional neural net-
work for joint iris detection and presentation attack detec-
tion. IEEE Winter Conference on Applications of Computer
Vision Workshops (WACVW), 2018.
[4] A. Czajka. Database of iris printouts and its application: De-
velopment of liveness detection method for iris recognition.
In International Conference on Methods Models in Automa-
tion Robotics (MMAR), pages 28–33, 2013.
[5] A. Czajka. Pupil dynamics for iris liveness detection. IEEE
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security (TIFS),
10(4):726–735, 2015.
[6] A. Czajka and K. W. Bowyer. Presentation attack detection
for iris recognition: An assessment of the state-of-the-art.
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR), 51(4):86:1–86:35, 2018.
[7] J. Daugman. Countermeasures against subterfuge. Biomet-
rics: Personal Identification in Networked Society, pages
103–121, 1999.
[8] J. Daugman and C. Downing. Epigenetic randomness, com-
plexity and singularity of human iris patterns. Proceedings
of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences (Proc Biol Sci),
268:1737–40, 2001.
[9] J. G. Daugman. High confidence visual recognition of per-
sons by a test of statistical independence. IEEE Transac-
tions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence (PAMI),
15(11), 1993.
[10] J. Deng, W. Dong, R. Socher, L.-J. Li, K. Li, and L. Fei-
Fei. ImageNet: A Large-Scale Hierarchical Image Database.
IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recogni-
tion (CVPR), 2009.
[11] J. S. Doyle and K. W. Bowyer. Robust Detection of Tex-
tured Contact Lenses in Iris Recognition Using BSIF. IEEE
Access, 3:1672–1683, 2015.
[12] D. Gragnaniello, G. Poggi, C. Sansone, and L. Verdoliva.
An investigation of local descriptors for biometric spoofing
detection. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and
Security (TIFS), 10:849–863, 2015.
[13] L. He, H. Li, F. Liu, N. Liu, Z. Sun, and Z. He. Multi-patch
Convolution Neural Network for Iris Liveness Detection. In-
ternational Conference on Biometrics: Theory, Applications,
and Systems (BTAS), 2016.
[14] S. Hoffman, R. Sharma, and A. Ross. Convolutional neu-
ral networks for iris presentation attack detection: Toward
cross-dataset and cross-sensor generalization. IEEE Con-
ference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Work-
shops (CVPRW), pages 1701–17018, 2018.
[15] S. Hoffman, R. Sharma, and A. Ross. Iris + ocular: General-
ized iris presentation attack detection using multiple convo-
lutional neural networks. International Conference on Bio-
metrics (ICB), 2019.
[16] Y. Hu, K. Sirlantzis, and G. Howells. Iris liveness detection
using regional features. Pattern Recognition Letters (PRL),
82:242–250, 2016.
[17] G. Huang, Z. Liu, L. v. d. Maaten, and K. Q. Weinberger.
Densely connected convolutional networks. IEEE Confer-
ence on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR),
pages 2261–2269, 2017.
[18] K. Hughes and K. W. Bowyer. Detection of contact-lens-
based iris biometric spoofs using stereo imaging. Hawaii
International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS), 2013.
[19] M. Kanematsu, H. Takano, and K. Nakamura. Highly re-
liable liveness detection method for iris recognition. SICE
Annual Conference, pages 361–364, 2007.
[20] O. Komogortsev and A. Karpov. Liveness detection via ocu-
lomotor plant characteristics: Attack of mechanical replicas.
International Conference on Biometrics (ICB), pages 1–8,
2013.
[21] O. V. Komogortsev, A. Karpov, and C. D. Holland. Attack
of mechanical replicas: Liveness detection with eye move-
ments. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Se-
curity (TIFS), 10(4):716–725, 2015.
[22] S. J. Lee, K. R. Park, and J. Kim. Robust fake iris detection
based on variation of the reflectance ratio between the iris
and the sclera. Biometrics Symposium: Special Session on
Research at the Biometric Consortium Conference, pages 1–
6, 2006.
[23] S. Marcel, M. S. Nixon, J. Fie´rrez, and N. W. D. Evans, ed-
itors. Handbook of Biometric Anti-Spoofing - Presentation
Attack Detection, Second Edition. Advances in Computer
Vision and Pattern Recognition. Springer, 2019.
[24] D. Menotti, G. Chiachia, A. Pinto, W. R. Schwartz,
H. Pedrini, A. X. Falcao, and A. Rocha. Deep Represen-
tations for Iris, Face, and Fingerprint Spoofing Detection.
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
(TIFS), 10(4):864–879, 2015.
[25] A. Pacut and A. Czajka. Aliveness detection for iris bio-
metrics. IEEE International Carnahan Conferences Security
Technology (ICCST), pages 122 – 129, 2006.
[26] F. Pala and B. Bhanu. Iris liveness detection by relative dis-
tance comparisons. IEEE Conference on Computer Vision
and Pattern Recognition Workshops (CVPRW), pages 664–
671, 2017.
[27] R. Raghavendra and C. Busch. Robust Scheme for Iris Pre-
sentation Attack Detection using Multiscale Binarized Sta-
tistical Image Features. IEEE Transactions on Information
Forensics and Security (TIFS), 10(4):703–715, 2015.
[28] R. Raghavendra, K. B. Raja, and C. Busch. Contlensnet:
Robust iris contact lens detection using deep convolutional
neural networks. IEEE Winter Conference on Applications
of Computer Vision (WACV), pages 1160–1167, 2017.
[29] N. Rahaman, A. Baratin, D. Arpit, F. Draxler, M. Lin,
F. Hamprecht, Y. Bengio, and A. Courville. On the spec-
tral bias of neural networks. International Conference on
Machine Learning (ICML), 97:5301–5310, 2019.
[30] K. B. Raja, R. Raghavendra, and C. Busch. Video presenta-
tion attack detection in visible spectrum iris recognition us-
ing magnified phase information. IEEE Transactions on In-
formation Forensics and Security (TIFS), 10(10):2048–2056,
2015.
[31] R. Ramachandra and C. Busch. Robust scheme for iris pre-
sentation attack detection using multiscale binarized statisti-
cal image features. IEEE Transactions on Information Foren-
sics and Security (TIFS), 10:703–715, 2015.
[32] R. R. Selvaraju, M. Cogswell, A. Das, R. Vedantam,
D. Parikh, and D. Batra. Grad-CAM: Visual explanations
from deep networks via gradient-based localization. The
IEEE International Conference on Computer Vision (ICCV),
2017.
[33] K. Simonyan and A. Zisserman. Very deep convolutional
networks for large-scale image recognition. International
Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR), 2015.
[34] The Notre Dame Contact Lense Dataset 2015.
https://cvrl.nd.edu/projects/data/#the-notre-dame-contact-
lense-dataset-2015ndcld15.
[35] L. van der Maaten and G. Hinton. Visualizing high-
dimensional data using t-sne. Journal of Machine Learning
Research (JMLR), page 25792605, 2008.
[36] Z. J. Xu, Y. Zhang, and Y. Xiao. Training behavior of
deep neural network in frequency domain. International
Conference On Neural Information Processing (ICONIP),
11953:264–274, 2019.
[37] D. Yadav, N. Kohli, J. S. Doyle, R. Singh, M. Vatsa, and
K. W. Bowyer. Unraveling the effect of textured contact
lenses on iris recognition. IEEE Transactions on Informa-
tion Forensics and Security (TIFS), 9(5):851–862, 2014.
[38] D. Yadav, N. Kohli, M. Vatsa, R. Singh, and A. Noore. De-
tecting textured contact lens in uncontrolled environment us-
ing densepad. IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision
and Pattern Recognition Workshops (CVPRW), pages 2336–
2344, 2019.
[39] S. Yadav, C. Chen, and A. Ross. Relativistic discriminator:
A one-class classifier for generalized iris presentation attack
detection. IEEE Winter Conference on Applications of Com-
puter Vision (WACV), 2020.
[40] D. Yambay, B. Becker, N. Kohli, D. Yadav, A. Czajka,
K. W. Bowyer, S. Schuckers, R. Singh, M. Vatsa, A. Noore,
D. Gragnaniello, C. Sansone, L. Verdoliva, L. He, Y. Ru,
H. Li, N. Liu, Z. Sun, and T. Tan. LivDet iris 2017 iris live-
ness detection competition 2017. IEEE International Joint
Conference on Biometrics (IJCB), pages 733–741, 2017.
[41] D. Yambay, J. S. Doyle, K. W. Bowyer, A. Czajka, and
S. Schuckers. LivDet-iris 2013– iris liveness detection com-
petition 2013. IEEE International Joint Conference on Bio-
metrics (ICB), pages 1–8, 2014.
[42] D. Yambay, B. Walczak, S. Schuckers, and A. Czajka.
LivDet-Iris 2015 - iris liveness detection competition 2015.
In IEEE International Conference on Identity, Security, and
Behavior Analysis (ISBA), pages 1–6, 2017.
[43] H. Zhang, Z. Sun, T. Tan, and J. Wang. Learning hierarchi-
cal visual codebook for iris liveness detection. IEEE Inter-
national Joint Conference on Biometrics (IJCB), pages 1–8,
2015.
